This article examines schizophrenic experience from a phenomenological point of view to determine how it differs from normal experience. The autobiographical investigations of Wouter Kusters serve as a guide. In his famous study on schizophrenia, Alphonse De Waelhens gives a psychoanalytical account of psychotic experiences. For De Waelhens psychosis stems from a lack of desire, a perspective which implies that psychoanalytical therapy should aim to fill this lack. There are several problems arising from this perspective, which however are easily confronted when one conceptualises desire in a spinozian sense. Anti-Oedipus, a book by Deleuze and Guattari, is grounded in this spinozistic model. The schizophrenic lacks nothing, they argue, it may even be the case that he or she is torn by an overabundance of desire. These findings demand radical therapeutic change, according to Deleuze and Guattari.
In these times of the increasing neurologisation of the person, the question is not only how psychoanalysis can or should relate to the neurosciences, but also how it should position itself in relation to psychology, as the latter has seemingly unproblematically aligned itself with the new hegemonious discourse. The author argues that philosophy, specifically political philosophy and ideology critique, that can bring clarity here. The central idea is that where neurologisation and psychologisation merge, psychoanalysis shall have to clarify its conception of materialism. To paraphrase Rimbaud: Il faut absolument être materialiste. Arising primarily from a critical dialogue with the philosopher Adrian Johnston, the author claims that psychoanalysis deals with a decentred materiality, a materiality of the object a.
During the 60s, at a time when many leading philosophers were showing an interest in Sade, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan also wrote an essay on the literary works of the libertine aristocrat D.A.F. de Sade, often called “The Divine Marquis”. That essay, entitled “Kant avec Sade”, is regularly cited but rarely discussed in any depth by philosophers and psychoanalysts, partly as a result of Lacan’s baroque style of writing, his sloppy formulations, and his suggestive language. However, in spite of this, Lacan’s text is worthwhile reading. The central idea is that Sade’s oeuvre reveals the truth of Kant’s moral philosophy. In his article, the author shows that this remarkable thesis can be understood in at least two ways. Moreover, it is also argued that Lacan’s thesis can be read in a reverse direction, although Lacan himself never says that explicitly. It will be shown in the third section that according to Lacan, Kant is the truth of Sade.
This paper analyses the idea that Frege and Lacan can be connected through a transcendental line of thought. From this viewpoint Frege’s development of modern formal logic is considered as a moment in modernity that shows that the challenge of formalization or mathematization is in fact a challenge of identification of both subject and object. Lacan’s thinking is in accord with this endeavour, but it articulates more explicitly and symbolically the connection between formalization and identification. A crucial point in our argument is that a transcendental viewpoint is not necessarily incompatible with a lacanian viewpoint, to the extent, namely, that attention is paid to the idea that subject and object are first and foremost of the order of writing or the symbolic.