In this meditation, the author enumerates, in reference to his clinical practise as well as to his reading of Freud and Lacan, six laws of repetition: 1. repetition is continuous; 2. repetition operates in function of life; 3. repetition does not come down to mere reproduction but exists only through variation; 4. in repetition, smaller and bigger “rounds” are to be differentiated; 5. repetition operates in function of the cruelty of jouissance; 6. when one realizes that, beyond any mastering of the smaller rounds of repetition, the big round finds its way, then it already is too late.
In this paper Serge Tisseron’s analysis of the work of Georges Remi is revisited from a Lacanian point of view. Special attention is paid to the function of the signifier and to the function of narrative in the phenomenon of the transmission of the unsaid. Hergé’s questioning of the father is analysed both at the level of the narrative of Les aventures de Tintin (The Adventures of Tintin) and at the level of his biography. It is shown, moreover, that the link between these different narratives is to be found in the signifiers.
The article deals with the idea that the origin of the becoming of the subject is symbiotic. After a historical introduction, this concept is explored as well from a developmental as from a deferred perspective. The insurmountable problems arising during these considerations lead to the conclusion that there is no adequate proof to accept the hypothesis of the symbiosis.
Taking Kierkegaard, i.e. one of Lacan’s main references with respect to the notion of repetition, as a starting point, the author firstly situates this reference in Lacan’s seminar. It is argued that Lacan confronts Kierkegaard’s notion of repetition with the Platonic idea of reminiscence. Further it is shown that according to Lacan it is repetition rather than reminiscence that structures human experience. Secondly the author revisists Kierkegaard’s On repetition (1843) and argues that a sharp distinction should be drawn between Kierkegaard’s conception of repetition and the Greek one. Finally it is shown that Kierkegaard’s philosophical insights were at odds with the very way in which he faced life (Regine) and death (father).
This article investigates the Lacanian notion of the “desire of the analyst”. Several topics are discussed concerning this enigmatic desire. First of all, the author argues against the conception that the analyst has no desire to cure. Also discussed is the notion that the views of the analyst about “health” have ethical and technical consequences. The author conceives health here as a matter of wanting to know about one’s own unconscious. One of the crucial paths towards this knowledge is via transference, as the encounter between two supposed knowing subjects. The ways in which the transference is evoked, its relationship to love, the paths it follows, its ending and modalities of interpretation are discussed.